In this comment, we analyze a recently proposed Baptista-like cryptosystem and show that it is not invertible. Others weaknesses are also reported. A modified version of this cryptosystem is proposed to show how to overcome the non-invertibility.
Introduction
In [1] M.S. Baptista proposed a chaos-based cryptosystem. The Baptista system uses the logistic map to generate chaos. A subset of the phase space of the logistic map, [X min , X max ] ⊂ [0, 1], is divided into 256 equal subintervals and each 8-bit plaintext character is assigned to one subinterval. The encryption process of a given plaintext character consists of iterating the logistic map until the state reaches the subinterval assigned to that character. The ciphertext corresponding to the plaintext character is the number of iterations.
Since Baptista's original proposal, many variants were proposed to enhance the performance of the original cryptosystem [2, 3, 4, 5] . However, most of these modified Baptista-like cryptosystems have been cryptanalyzed [6, 7, 8] .
Recently, a new variant of the original Baptista cryptosystem was proposed in [9] . In this paper, we analyze this new variant and demonstrate that it is not invertible. We also show that the new variant suffers from the same weaknesses as the original Baptista cryptosystem.
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2 gives a brief description of the cryptosystem under study. In Section 3, we demonstrate the non-invertibility of the cryptosystem through a simple example. In Section 4, it is shown that the cryptosystem has some drawbacks when the underlying chaotic map is not selected properly. Section 5 shows how the key space can be drastically reduced by a partial key recovery attack. Section 6 demonstrates that there is a link between the size of the distortion matrix and the encryption time, which leads to a possible timing attack. In Section 7, we discuss how to modify the cryptosystem under study to make it invertible. In the last section, the main findings reported in this paper are summarized.
Brief description of the cryptosystem
The cryptosystem proposed in [9] transforms a plaintext into a ciphertext using the ergodic property of a certain chaotic map f λ : I → I, for λ ∈ J, I, J ⊂ R. The phase space I is divided into N disjoint intervals, where N is the cardinality of the alphabet of plaintexts. Each of those intervals is associated with one symbol in the alphabet of plaintexts. For a plaintext P = p 1 p 2 . . . p m of length m, with p i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N }, the encryption procedure comprises the following steps:
1. Group the plaintext into a set of vectors B j of length k ∈ N, where j = 1, 2, . . . , m/k. 2. Multiply each vector B j by a k × k distortion matrix A of integers to get a new vector Y j as follows: The secret key of the cryptosystem under study is composed of two subkeys, i.e., k = (k 1 , k 2 ). The first subkey k 1 is the initial condition x 0 and k 2 is the distortion matrix A. The authors of [9] propose two possible chaotic maps to be used in the encryption process. The first proposed map is the logistic map, which is defined by
where the phase space is I = [0, 1] and λ = 4. The other chaotic map is the skew tent map:
where I = [0, 1] and λ ∈ (0, 1) is a public parameter. The decryption procedure is roughly the inverse of the encryption procedure. Please refer to [9] for more details.
Non-invertible encryption procedure
Any encryption scheme must be designed in such a way that the recovering of the plaintext from ciphertext can be performed when the secret key is known. However, this is not the case for the cryptosystem described in [9] . Indeed, Step 4 of the encryption procedure does not implement a one-to-one operation. The operation transforms m integers {z i } (numbers of chaotic iterations) into m symbols {u i } in a smaller set (the plaintext alphabet). Apparently, two different numbers of chaotic iterations may lead the chaotic orbit to the same interval and thus the same symbol u i . In other words, in the decryption procedure, if one meets a symbol u i , one has no clue on how to determine the value of z i . If one simply picks the smallest number of iterations which corresponds to u i , which may not be the correct value, then the recovered plaintext will be wrong.
In the following, we illustrate this non-invertibility problem with a simple example. Assume that the plaintext has 4 different symbols {s 1 = 0, s 2 = 1, s 3 = 2, s 4 = 3}. In this case, the interval I = [0, 1] is divided into 4 equal subintervals corresponding to the four symbols. . By iterating the logistic map three times and then two times, we can get {s 3 , s 1 } = {2, 0}, and the final ciphertext will be C = {1, 4}. To decrypt the ciphertext, iterate the logistic map from x 0 one time and then four times, we will find the symbols {s 3 , s 1 } = {2, 0}. Iterate the logistic map until its chaotic orbit falls into the subinterval associated with the symbol s 3 = 2. Then, continue the iteration until the chaotic orbit falls into the subinterval associated with the symbol s 1 = 0.
Finally we get {1, 4}. Do the inverse distortion operation, we have
Since −10 and 7 do not correspond to any symbols in the plaintext alphabet, the cryptosystem fails. Even if we map −10 and 7 to {0, 1, 2, 3} via mod4, we will get {2, 3}, which is still wrong. Now we see the cryptosystem under study is not invertible and the original plaintext cannot be always recovered.
Problems arising from the selection of the chaotic map
Baptista's cryptosystem encrypts each plaintext symbol through a searching process along the orbit of a chaotic map. Originally the chaotic map used for encryption was the logistic map. However, the efficiency of the cryptosystem requires that the time necessary to locate the plaintext in a given orbit is independent of the value of the plaintext. This implies that the chaotic map involved should have a uniform invariant density function. Since the logistic map does not have a uniform invariant density function, it should be avoided in the searching-based chaotic cipher 1 . Good alternatives to the logistic map are piecewise linear chaotic maps [10] (such as the skew tent map), since they possess a uniform invariant density function for all possible values of the control parameter.
Partial key recovery attack
In the context of a secure and robust encryption system it is assumed that the partial knowledge of the key does not reveal information about the rest of the key and, as a result, the cryptosystem performance is not harmed [11, Rule 7] . As mentioned above, the secret key of the cryptosystem described in [9] consists of two subkeys, the initial condition x 0 (k 1 = x 0 ) used in the iteration of the chaotic map and the distortion matrix A (k 2 = A). If one knows the value of x 0 , then a known-plaintext attack can be used to infer the matrix A. Indeed, if x 0 is known then Steps 4 and 5 of the encryption procedure are canceled. Since Step 3 does not depend on any subkey, it can also be skipped. Then one has both Y j and B j . With k different values of B j and the corresponding values of Y j , one can get two k × k matrices B and Y which satisfy AB = Y . If the rank of A is k, one can immediately derive A = Y B −1 . If the rank of B is less than k, more (B j , Y j ) pairs are needed to find k values of B j which form a full-rank matrix. On the other hand, if the matrix A is known, then the cryptosystem can be attacked using any of the strategies explained in [8] . Therefore, the key space is drastically reduced to be the sum of the key spaces corresponding to the two subkeys, rather than their product.
Efficiency of the distortion process
The authors of [9] introduce the distortion matrix A in order to avoid the keystream recovery attack described in [7, 8] . Certainly, if the link between the symbols and the intervals is not known, then the keystream can not be recovered. Nevertheless, if the output of the distortion process is the number of times to iterate the chaotic map, it means that the encryption/decryption time depends on the value of the elements of A. In other words, the encryption/decryption time changes with the subkey k 2 , which could make it possible to estimate the value of the key through a timing attack. Therefore, it is highly recommendable to establish another distortion procedure as the one described in [12] . In this case, the plaintext is encrypted from its binary codification, and each interval of the phase space is assigned in a random way to either a 0 or 1 bit.
Making the cryptosystem invertible
In this section, we show how the cryptosystem under study can be modified to be invertible. Note that we do not intend to improve the security of the original cryptosystem, but simply try to show how the non-invertibility problem can be overcome.
Since the non-invertibility problem is due to the chaotic iterations in Step 4 of the original cryptosystem, if we remove the chaotic iterations from Step 4 and adjust other steps accordingly, we will be able to get an invertible cryptosystem. The modified encryption procedure will comprise the following steps:
1. Group the plaintext into a set of vectors B j of length k ∈ N, where j = 1, 2, . . . , m/k. The decryption procedure is straightforward, so we omit it here.
It is clear that the modified cryptosystem is just a simple combination of secret matrix computation (Step 2) and the original Baptista's chaos-based cryptosystem (Step 5). Since both steps are invertible, the whole encryption process is also invertible. Taking the same example in Section 3, we can show more clearly how the non-invertibility problem is solved. Let the plaintext be P = {s 1 , s 2 } = {0, 1}. The result of the distortion process is 2 3 1 2 0 1 mod 4 = 3 2 , which corresponds to a symbol sequence {s 4 , s 3 }.
Finally, iterate the chaotic map and we will get the final ciphertext C = {2, 1}. Decrypting the ciphertext with the original Baptista's method will lead to the same symbol sequence {s 4 , s 3 } = {3, 2}. Performing the inverse distortion process, we have A −1 3 2 mod 4 = 2 1 3 2 3 2 mod 4 = 0 1 . Now we get the original plaintext {s 1 , s 2 } = {0, 1} back.
Conclusions
In this paper, we analyzed a recent chaotic encryption proposal. We demonstrated that the proposal involves a non-invertible encryption transformation. We also showed that the algorithm suffers from some other structural weaknesses which lead to more security problems.
